

Appendix A: Variables Used in this Study

As noted in the research design of this study, the variables used here come from 3 sources, the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, the polity dataset, and the Fox religion data designed for use with the MAR dataset. They are either taken directly from the datasets or constructed from variables available in the datasets. In order to facilitate replication of this study, we have included the code name assigned by the various datasets for each variable in parentheses after the variable's name. The variables from the various datasets were coded based on the following criteria.

The Minorities at Risk Variables

These variables are all included in the MAR dataset which can be downloaded at www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar.

Political Discrimination (*polres*): This variable measures a list of specific types of political discrimination on the following scale:

0. The activity is not significantly restricted for any.
1. The activity is slightly restricted for most or all group members or sharply restricted for some of them.
1. The activity is prohibited or sharply restricted for most or all group members.

The results are then added. The specific types of discrimination included in this variable are: restrictions on freedom of expression; restrictions on free movement and place of residence; restrictions on rights in judicial proceedings; restrictions on political organization; restrictions on voting; restrictions on recruitment to the police and military; restrictions on access to the civil service; restrictions on attainment of high office; and "other" types of restrictions.

Economic discrimination (*ecdis*): This variable measures the extent of official restrictions on the minority's economic activities on the following scale.

0. None
1. The group is economically advantaged. Public policies are designed to improve the relative economic position of other groups.
2. Significant poverty and under representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group's material well-being.
3. Significant poverty and under representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group's material well-being.
4. Significant poverty and under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.
5. Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.

Cultural discrimination(*culres*): This variable measures the restrictions that are placed on the pursuit or expression of the group's cultural interests based on a more specific list of restrictions measured on the following scale:

0. No restrictions;
1. informal restrictions;
2. the activity is 'somewhat' restricted;
3. the activity is 'sharply' restricted.

These restrictions include: restrictions on observance of group religion; restrictions on speaking and publishing in the group's language or dialect; restrictions on instruction in the group's language; restrictions on celebration of group holidays, ceremonies, cultural events; restrictions on dress, appearance, behavior; restrictions on marriage, family life; restrictions on organizations that promote the group's cultural interests; and other types of restriction. The codings are summed and divided by two, creating an indicator that measures from 0 to 12.

The above three are available for the following periods: 1990-1991, 1992-1993, 1994-1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. In the study we use the 1990-1991, 1994-1995 and 1998 versions.

The following variable is available only for 1996, 1997, and 1998 and the 1996 and 1998 versions are used in our study.

Repression: This variable is a composite variable combining 23 individual measures of repression. Each one is measured on the following scale and the resulting codes are added:

0. tactic not used;
1. tactic used against group members engaged in collective action;
2. tactic used against group members in ambiguous situations;
3. tactic used against group members not engaged in collective action.

The categories so coded are: small scale arrests of group members (*rep01*); large scale arrests of group members (*rep02*); the arrest of group leaders (*rep03*); show trials of group leaders (*rep04*); torture of group members (*rep05*); execution of group members (*rep06*); execution of group leaders (*rep07*); reprisal killings of civilians (*rep08*); killings by death squads (*rep09*); property confiscated or destroyed (*rep10*); restrictions on movement (*rep11*); forced resettlement (*rep12*); interdiction of food supplies (*rep13*); ethnic cleansing (*rep14*); systematic domestic spying (*rep15*); states of emergency (*rep16*); saturation of police/military (*rep17*); limited use of force against protestors (*rep18*); and unrestrained use of force against protestors (*rep19*); military campaigns against armed rebels (*rep20*); military targets and destroys rebel areas (*rep21*); military massacres of suspected rebel supporters (*rep22*); and other government repression (*rep23*).

Cultural differences between the majority and minority group (*culdifxx*): This variable measures the cultural difference between the majority and minority group based on several qualities including: different ethnicity or nationality; different language; different historical origin; different religion; different social customs; and different residence. Based on these differences, the variable is coded on the following scale:

0. No socially significant differences.

1. Slight differentials: one or two of the above differences exist.
2. Substantial differentials: three of the above differences exist.
3. Major differentials: four of the above differences exist.
4. Extreme differentials: five or six of the above differences exist.

The variable is coded only once for the entire period covered by the dataset as these differences generally do not change over time. This variable is included based on the argument that groups which are culturally dissimilar are more likely to engage in conflict. Groups define themselves through their differences with others and those that are more different are more likely to be identified as the 'other' and targeted for discrimination. Gurr (1993a; 1993b) and Horowitz (1985: 64-87, 141-184) make similar arguments.

Minority grievances over autonomy issues: This variable was constructed by adding five types of grievances over autonomy. Each of these component variables was measured on the following scale:

0. no restrictions;
1. informal restrictions;
2. the activity is 'somewhat' restricted;
3. the activity is 'sharply' restricted.

The types of autonomy grievances included in this variable are: general concern for greater autonomy (*autgr1*); desire for union with kindred groups (*autgr2*); seeking political independence (*autgr3*); seeking greater regional autonomy (*autgr4*); and seeking widespread autonomy (*autgr5*); This variable is available for the following periods: 1990-1991, 1992-1993, and 1994-1995. This variable is included because many, like Gurr (1993a: 294, 1996: 54), Horowitz (1985: 229-284), Kumar (1997), and Robin Williams (1994) argue that separatist demands are particularly threatening to the state. Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that such demands are likely to provoke discrimination.

Contagion of protest in the 1990s (*iconpro9*) and Contagion of rebellion in the 1990s

(*iconreb9*): This variable measures the extent to which conflict moves across borders. There are two variables used to measure this here, one for protest and one for rebellion. The first measures the mean level of protest in the 1990s within the geographic region in which the minority group lives. The second does the same for rebellion in the 1990s. The MAR measure for protest is as follows:

0. None reported.
1. Verbal opposition—includes public letters, petitions, posters, publications, etc.
2. Symbolic resistance—includes cattered acts of symbolic resistance (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property) or political organizing activity on a substantial scale.
3. Small-scale demonstrations—no more than 10,000 attend any single demonstration.
4. Medium-scale demonstrations—between 10,000 and 100,000 attend largest demonstration.
5. Large scale demonstrations—at least 100,000 attend a single demonstration.

The MAR measure for rebellion is as follows:

0. None reported.
1. Political banditry and/or sporadic terrorism.
2. Campaigns of terrorism.
3. Local rebellions.
4. Small-scale guerrilla activity—All of the following must exist: 1) fewer than 1000 armed fighters; 2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported per year); and 3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales.
5. Intermediate-scale guerilla activity—has one or two of the defining traits of small-scale guerilla activity and one or two of the defining traits og large-scale guerilla activity.
6. Large scale guerilla activity—All of the following must exist: 1) more than 1000 armed fighters; 2) frequent armed attacks (more than 6 per year); and 3) attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group.
7. Protracted civil war—fought by rebel military units with base areas.

Many, including Gurr (1993a; 1993b) argue this is an important element of ethnic conflict.

International political and military support for the minority group (*ispol9* and *ismil9*).

There are two variables for international support for minority groups used here. The first

measures political support on the following scale:

0. No support recorded.
1. Ideological encouragement.
2. Non-military financial support.
3. Access to external markets and communications.
4. Peacekeeping units or instituting a blockade.

The second measures military support on the following scale:

0. No support recorded.
1. Funds for military supplies or direct military equipment.
2. Military training or provision of military advisors.
3. Rescue missions, cross-border raids, or peacekeeping units.
4. Cross-border sanctuaries, or in-country combat units.

This support can come from foreign governments, kindred groups living in another state, non governmental organizations, or international organizations. Both of these variables cover the 1994-1995 period. It is reasonable to argue that international support for minority groups challenging a state make that state more likely to react with discrimination.

Per-capita GNP: This variable is not included in the MAR dataset and was added by the authors based on the 1995 UN statistical yearbook. This variable is included because the economic situation in a state has a major impact on the political environment and, accordingly, could conceivably influence discrimination.

Polity Dataset Variables

These variables, while included in the MAR dataset, were taken by the MAR project from the polity dataset or are based on variables from this dataset.

Democracy in 1994 (*democ94*): This variable is based on a variable in the Polity dataset. It ranges from 0 to 10 and was constructed based on four factors.¹ First, competitiveness of

¹ The description of the codes of this variable are based on Jagers and Gurr (1995: 472).

political participation which was coded as follows:

0. Suppressed or restricted
1. Factional
2. Transitional
3. Competitive

Second, competitiveness of executive recruitment which was coded as follows

0. Selection
1. Transitional
2. Election

Third, openness of executive recruitment which was coded as follows:

0. Hereditary or closed
1. Election

Finally, constraints on the chief executive which was coded as follows:

0. No more than slight to moderate limitations.
1. Between substantial and slight to moderate limitations.
2. Substantial limitations
3. Between previous and following category.
4. Executive parity or subordination.

Thus this variable focuses mostly on institutional aspect of democracy. This focus is because the Polity dataset covers all countries in the world going back to 1800 (though the variable used in this study is the one specifically for 1994). Since information on other aspects of liberal democracy such as individual rights is scarce for much of this time period, focusing on the institutional aspects provides a measure that can be applied throughout this time period.² (Jaggers

² For more details and reliability tests on this variable see Jaggers and Gurr (1995: 473). It is important to note that there is also a variable measuring autocracy from the POLITY dataset available in

and Gurr, 1995: 469-471) A truncated version of this variable is also used that divides this spectrum of 0 to 10 into 3 categories: autocracies (0-2), semi-democracies (3-7), and democracies (8-10). Finally, it should be noted that only the composite democracy variable is included in the MAR dataset and not the four components.

Democracy-squared is a variable that is used to isolate the influence of semi-democracies. This is done by taking the above variable, subtracting five and squaring the result. The resulting variable places semi-democracies at close to zero and the more democratic and autocratic of states at close to twenty-five.³

Democratization measures the extent to which states became more democratic between 1989 and 1994. This was done by taking the above variable for democracy and subtracting the democracy measure for 1989 (*democ89*). This variable is included because it is arguable that newly democratic or newly semi-democratic states may discriminate more due to residual policies from when their governments were less democratic.

Fox Dataset on Religion for Use with the MAR Dataset

These variables are taken from the Fox religion data which was designed for use with the MAR dataset and can be downloaded separately from the MAR website. These variables are included for two reasons. First, Huntington (1993; 1996a; 1996b) implicitly argues that religion is becoming more relevant to conflicts in the post Cold War era and that this is changing

the MAR dataset. It is constructed from the same components as the democracy variable with the addition of a measure for regulation of political participation and also ranges from 0 to 10 but with 10 being the most autocratic. The democracy variable was chosen for this study because the variables are very similar (the correlation between the two variables in 1994 is $-.868$, $p < .001$). Other studies have used combinations of the autocracy and democracy variables. Adding the two results in an inaccurate variable. For instance a state which scored in the mid-range say 5 on both variables would have a total of 10, the same as if a state scored 0 on one variable and 10 on the other. Thus, a semi-democracy would have the same score as a democracy. Furthermore a state which scored 10 on the democracy variable and a 0 on the autocracy variable would have the same score of 10 as a state which scored a 10 on the autocracy variable and a 0 on the democracy variable. Subtracting the two creates a variable that ranges for -10 to 10 but is statistically nearly identical to the democracy variable (the correlation between the autocracy minus democracy and the democracy variable is $-.974$, $p < .001$).

³ Similar variables were used in studies by Hegre et. al. (2001), Ellingsen & Gledisch (1997), and

the dynamics of world politics. He posits that in the post Cold War era, conflicts will be between “civilizations.” Huntington uses religion as part of his definition of civilization⁴ and his classification of the world’s civilizations appears to be mainly along religious lines.⁵ Second, some specific statistical studies using the MAR, including Fox (1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b), found that religion variables influence the ethnic conflict process. These variables are not in the MAR3 dataset.

It is important to note that these variables were coded only for ethnoreligious groups. Protestant and Catholic Christianity are considered separate religions for the purposes of this data. However, Orthodox Christianity is not considered sufficiently different from either Protestantism or Catholicism for such conflicts to be included. The Sunni and Shi’i branches of Islam are considered separate religions for the purpose of this study. Also, these groups are only included in these 105 cases if there is a viable government that is in control of the state in question.

Whether the state has an official religion in 1994-1995 (*rleg495*): This variable simply measures whether or not the state designates a particular religion as the official religion of the state.

The relevance of religion to the conflict (*rrelevnt*): This variable measures whether religious issues are more or less important than other political, cultural, economic or autonomy issues. It is based on the comparative extent of discrimination and grievances expressed over

Fox (1999b).

⁴Huntington (1993: 24) defines a civilization as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of what distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined by both common language, history, *religion*, customs, institutions and by the subjective self identification of people.’ (Italics added by this author for emphasis.)

⁵ Huntington (1993: 25) divides the world into eight major civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and ‘possibly’ African. That four of these categories are religious is telling. Also, the others, except the African civilization, are largely religiously homogeneous.

political, cultural, economic, and autonomy issues as compared to discrimination and grievances expressed over religious issues. Variables for all of these factors exist either in the Fox data or the MAR dataset. The variable is coded on the following scale:

0. Religious issues are not relevant
1. Marginal relevance. Issues are basically of a non-religious nature but religion is being used to legitimize those issues and/or mobilize the group.
2. Religious issues are significant but are less important than other non-religious issues.
3. Religion is one of several significant issues which are of roughly equal importance.
4. Religion is the primary issue of the conflict but there are other significant issues involved.
5. Religion is the only issue relevant to the conflict.

Data Reliability

While, as noted in the main body of this study, the consistency of the POLTY and Fox data has been checked using backup codings by independent researchers (see, Fox, 1999b and Jagers and Gurr, 1995), this has not been done for the MAR data. However the project does assure reliability in other ways according to the MAR project's website (at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar):

The Minorities project has not systematically assessed inter-coder reliability nor have its indicators been systematically screened for internal consistency. Coders are well-trained student professionals and all codings are reviewed by senior personnel for final determination of codes. The results of spot checks of inter-coder reliability and regular meetings of coders have led to some revisions of coding rules and procedures; overall, the assessment of inter-coder reliability is highly satisfactory. Tests of internal consistency by Matthew Kocher of the University of Chicago in spring 1999 flagged some problem indicators and codings and the MAR staff are engaged in an ongoing effort to check suspect codings and to devise and code more precise indicators for a limited set of variables. All 1995 and 1998 country and group population data in the current dataset have been reviewed and corrected as part of this process....

[Furthermore] A major reorganization of the MAR data project was begun in early 1999 under the leadership of Dr. Marshall. Both the MAR

dataset and codebook were completely, mechanically overhauled. The organization and presentation of the indicators were redesigned to emphasize the theoretical coherence and research consistency of the MAR project. Related variables are reintegrated, regrouped, and reordered so that users can visually examine the data and track changes over time. The data itself remains largely unaltered, except for minor corrections and some reworking done to make variable values consistent across time.

Finally, it is important to note that all of these variables are coded based on the judgement of coders. It is rarely the case that none of the codings and categorizations will be disputed. In fact, it is arguable that in some cases there is no possible coding that will not be disputed by some. This is a classic drawback of cross-sectional database research. The only solution is to make use of consistent coding criteria, have it be applied by well-trained coders and follow it up with some form of reliability testing or quality assurance process. All three datasets used here do all of this.

Appendix B: Listing of All Cases based on Level of Democracy

This appendix contains a listing of the 105 ethnoreligious minorities included in this study, as well as the 162 non-religiously different minorities, grouped by level of democracy. This grouping is based solely on the democracy codings contained in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Phase 3 data. Although many of these cases are borderline and an argument could be made for placing them in other categories, it is argued here that this method of differentiating the groups is a reasonable and objective means of categorizing them because it is based on the considerable amount of research that went into creating the Polity dataset, from which the MAR dataset took these measures. Also, this categorization is based on the 1994 codings, which falls around the middle of the period covered by this study.

Finally, these listings constitute all minorities which meet the criteria for inclusion in the MAR dataset. Several countries are not represented here because they do not contain any minorities which meet these criteria. These criteria are described in detail in the methodology section of this article.

Table B1: Ethnoreligious Cases

<i>Level of democracy</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Minority group</i>	
Autocracy (0–2)	East Europe and the former USSR	Azerbaijan	Armenians Lezgins Russians	
		Tajikistan	Russians	
		Uzbekistan	Russians	
		Yugoslavia	Kosovo Albanians Sandzak Moslems	
		Asia	Bhutan	Lhotshampas
			Burma	Kachins Rohingya (Arakanese) Zomis (Chins)
			China	Hui Moslems Tibetans Turkmen
			Indonesia	Chinese East Timorese Papuan
			Laos	Hmong
	Singapore		Malays	
	North Africa and the Middle East	Vietnam	Montagnards	
		Egypt	Copts	
		Iran	Baha'i Bakhtiari Christians Turkmen	
		Iraq		Shi'i
			Lebanon	Druze Maronite Christians

	Sub-Saharan Africa	Saudi Arabia Cameroon	Shi'i Bamileke Kirdis
		Chad Kenya Nigeria	Southerners Maasais Ibo Ogani
		Sudan	Southerners
Semi-democracy (3–7)	East Europe and the former USSR	Albania Georgia	Greeks Abkhazians Adzhars
		Kazakhstan	Germans Russians
		Kyrgyzstan Russia	Russians Avars Buryat Chechens Ingush Karachay Kumyks Lezgins Tatars Tuvinians
	Asia	Ukraine Bangladesh Malaysia	Crimean Tartars Hindus Chinese Dayaks East Indians Kadazans Indian Tamils Sri lankan Tamils
	Sub-Saharan Africa	Ethiopia	Afars Somalis
	Latin America and the Caribbean	Ghana Senegal Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay	Mossi-Dagomba Diolas in Casamance Zapotecs Indigenous peoples Indigenous peoples
Democracy (8–10)	Western democracies and Japan	Canada	French Canadians Quebecois
		France Germany Greece Switzerland UK	Moslems (non-citizens) Turks Moslems Jurassians Asians Scots
	East Europe and the former USSR	Macedonia Bulgaria	Albanians Turks
	Asia	India	Kashmiris Mizos Moslems Nagas Sikhs Tripuras
		Pakistan	Ahmadis Hindus
		Philippines Thailand	Moros Malay Moslems

North Africa and the Middle East	Israel	Northern hill tribes Arabs Palestinians
Sub-Saharan Africa	Cyprus	Turkish Cypriots
	Botswana Namibia	San Bushmen San Bushmen
Latin America and the Caribbean	South Africa	Asians
	Costa Rica	Antillean Blacks
	Argentina	Indigenous peoples
	Bolivia	Highland indigenous peoples
		Lowland indigenous peoples
	Chile	Indigenous peoples
	Ecuador	Lowland indigenous peoples
Panama	Blacks Chinese	
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples	

Table B2: Non-ethnoreligious Cases

<i>Level of democracy</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Minority group</i>
Autocracy (0–2)	East Europe and the former USSR	Yugoslavia	Croats Hungarians Roma
		Asia	Burma
	North Africa and the Middle East		Indonesia
		Vietnam	Chinese
		Algeria	Berbers
		Iran	Arabs
			Azerbaijanis
		Baluchis	
	Iraq	Kurds	
		Sunnis	
	Jordan	Palestinians	
	Sub-Saharan Africa	Morocco	Berbers
			Saharawis
		Syria	Alawi
		Cameroon	Westerners
		Djibouti	Afars
Eritrea		Afars	
Guinea		Fulani	
		Malinka	
Susu			
Kenya		Kalenjins	
	Kikuyu		
Mauritania	Kisii		
	Luhya		
Luo			
Nigeria	Black Moors		
	Kewri		
Yoruba			

		Sierra Leone	Creoles Limba Mende Temne
		Togo	Ewe Kabre
		Uganda	Acholi Baganda
		Zimbabwe	Europeans Ndebele
Semi-democracy (3–7)	East Europe and the former USSR	Croatia	Roma Serbs
		Georgia	Ossetians (South) Russians
		Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks
		Moldova	Gagauz Slavs
		Romania	Magyars (Hungarians) Roma
		Russia	Roma Yakut
		Slovakia	Hungarians Roma
		Ukraine	Crimean Russians Russians
	Asia	Bangladesh	Biharis Chittagong hill tribes
		Cambodia	Vietnamese
		Taiwan	Aboriginal Taiwanese Mainland Chinese Taiwanese
	Sub-Saharan Africa	Ghana	Ashanti Ewe
		Mali	Tuareg
		Zambia	Bemebe Lozi
	Latin America and the Caribbean	Dominican Rep.	Haitian Blacks
		Guatemala	Indigenous peoples
		Honduras	Black Karibs Indigenous peoples
		Mexico	Mayans Other indigenous peoples
		Peru	Blacks (Afro-Peruvians) Highland indigenous peoples Lowland indigenous peoples
Democracy (8–10)	Western democracies and Japan	Australia	Aborigines
		Canada	Indigenous peoples
		France	Basques Corsicans Roma
		Greece	Roma
		Italy	Roma Sardinians
		Japan	South Tyrolians Koreans

	New Zealand	Maori
	Nordic	Saami
	Spain	Basques Catalans Roma
	Switzerland	Foreign workers
	UK	Afro-Caribbeans Catholics in Northern Ireland
	USA	African-Americans Hispanics Native Americans Native Hawaiians
East Europe and the former USSR	Belarus	Poles Russians
	Bulgaria	Roma
	Czech Rep.	Roma Slovaks
	Estonia	Russians
	Hungary	Roma
	Latvia	Russians
	Lithuania	Poles Russians
	Macedonia	Roma Serbs
Asia	India	Assamese Bodos Scheduled tribes
	Pakistan	Baluchis Mohajirs Pashtuns (Pushtuns) Sindhis
	Papua New Guinea	Bouganvilleans
	Philippines	Igorots
	South Korea	Honamese
	Thailand	Chinese
North Africa and the Middle East	Turkey	Kurds
Sub-Saharan Africa	Madagascar	Merina
	Namibia	Basters Europeans
	Niger	Tuareg
	South Africa	Coloreds Europeans Xhosa Zulus
Latin America and the Caribbean	Brazil	Afro-Brazilians Amazonian Indians
	Colombia	Blacks Indigenous peoples
	Ecuador	Blacks Highland indigenous peoples
	El Salvador	Indigenous peoples
	Panama	Indigenous peoples
	Venezuela	Blacks